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O'ER THE LAND OF THE FREE: ;FLAG
BURNING AS SPEECH

Kent Greenawal,t*

INTRODUCTION

I am honored to lecture at this school, which has a number of
friends, and a much larger circle of scholars whose work I admire.
I am honored to lecture in the memory of Melville Nimmer, one of
the country's leading thinkers on freedom of speech as well as its
foremost expert on copyright. I met Professor Nimmer only once,
at a lunch with Vince Blasi. My recollection of the lunch is distinct.
Gently and in the most friendly way, but with irrefutable logic, they
showed me that a position I had held for more than a decade about
immigration limits and the first amendment was mistaken. I am
stubborn enough so that does not happen too often. Before and
after this lunch, I was struck by the great warmth with which colleagues always spoke about Mel Nimmer. The sentiments went well
beyond intellectual respect to a deep affection. Mel obviously
avoided the self-centeredness that academic efforts often breed.
Perhaps the life of the mind is just another vanity, more innocuous
than most; but concern for others is not a vanity. One of my strongest impressions about Mel Nimmer's personal relations is that he
cared. That makes speaking in his memory a special privilege.
When I have worked on freedom of speech issues during the
last few years, Mel's treatise has illuminated many problems.' It
confronts abstruse theoretical questions and manages them with en* Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence, Columbia University School of Law; Visiting Professor, New York University School of Law. A slightly shorter version of this
Essay was presented as the Melville B. Nimmer Memorial Lecture at the UCLA School
of Law on April 3, 1990. I want to express my great appreciation to the Nimmer family
and the law school faculty for their warm reception during my visit. I am very grateful
to Michael Dowdel for his excellent research assistance and criticism and to Vince Blasi
for reviewing the manuscript.
I. M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1984).
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viable clarity, but it riever forgets that law is about practical decisions affecting our lives. One of the strongest sections in the treatise
is on symbolic speech;2 its discussion of flag desecration 3 is among
the best in the literature.
Flag burning has occupied much legal and political attention
lately, and it is my topic here. I consider the soundness of the
Supreme Court's decision last June in Texas v. Johnson 4 under general first amendment principles and ask whether the outcome
should be different for the federal statute whose validity is now
under review. 5 I also inquire whether some exception from ordinary principles is called for, to be achieved by a constitutional
amendment if necessary. The analysis draws out broader aspects of
the law of symbolic speech, and some references to Mel Nimmer's
understanding suggest the richness of his thought about that
subject.
I.

TEXAS V. JOHNSON AND THE RESPONSE

Last June the Supreme Court held, five to four, that Gregory
Johnson's conviction under a Texas statute punishing flag desecration violated the first amendment guarantee of free speech. 6 Johnson and other demonstrators during the 1984 Republican National
Convention had protested Republican policies and dramatized the
dangers of nuclear war. Johnson set a stolen American flag burning. He was convicted under a penal section entitled "Desecration
of Venerated Object," which forbade intentionally or knowingly
desecrating a state or national flag. 7 To "desecrate" meant to "deface, damage, or otherwise physically mistreat in a way that the
actor knows will seriously offend one or more persons likely to observe or discover his action." 8
Judged by attention and notoriety, Johnson was a major case.
Newspaper.s widely reported the opinions under leading headlines,
and the result upset many people. Politicians and columnists spoke
their minds. President Bush expressed dismay at what the Court
had done, and, echoing campaign themes, appealed to the values of
2. Id. § 3.06.
3. Id. § 3.06[E][l].
4. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
5. Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-131, 103 Stat. 777 (Oct. 28, 1989)
(amending 18 U.S.C. § 700 (1988)).
6. See Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
7. Id. at 2537 n. l.
8. Id. (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09(b) (Vernon 1974)).
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the flag. He spurred a serious effort to amend the Constitution that
gained great momentum in Congress. A revision of the federal law
on flag destruction, which proponents claimed could withstand constitutional challenge, deflected, at least temporarily, the effort to
amend the Constitution.
Despite these trappings of importance, the case is trivial by
some measures. Not many people want to burn flags. The decision
does not affect lives in the manner of Brown v. Board of Education 9
and Roe v. Wade. 10 The case lacks great doctrinal significance because it represents an application of existing first amendment doctrines. It does not protect some fundamental liberty of action. If
our country did not permit its flag to be desecrated, it would not be
much less free and democratic.
The relative triviality of Texas v. Johnson is striking when the
case is juxtaposed to the swift course of world events in 1989. The
thirst for political liberties has proved a powerful striving of the
human spirit, not just a shallow desire of a dominant bourgeois
class in capitalist societies. When one thinks of movements and issues in Eastern Europe, China, and South Africa, the question of a
right to burn the flag of one's country does not seem compelling.
But this comparative triviality shows something good and strong
about American democracy. Only a country whose fundamental
institutions are solid and accepted has the luxury to worry about
such a minor matter. A critic might respond that plenty of serious
issues face American democracy; obsession about flag burning
panders to an uninformed public :and reflects cowardice about confronting hard problems. The critic would be right. Still, wide
agreement exists on broadly liberal premises about the boundaries
of speech and protest. That people worry so much about this narrow form of political expression, rather than the substance of
messages of political dissent, suggests a firm understanding in support of a wide range of political expression.
II.

FIRST AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES

First amendment analysis of flag burning cases proceeds in
three stages. First, is flag burning a free speech problem at all? Second, if so, what is the standard for judging the constitutionality of
the state's effort to make it criminal? Third, what is the outcome
under that standard?
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Why Free Speech Is Involved

Does someone convicted for flag burning have a claim that he
was engaged in free speech? One conceivable position would be that
only writing and speaking, as well as perhaps art and music; count
as expression under the first amendment. All other (or ordinary)
acts would fall outside the protection of the free speech and free
press clauses. It is easy to see why the Court has long rejected this
position. As Nimmer pointed out; speaking and writing themselves
are communications by symbols; 11 if the significance of an ordinary
act is to express an idea, the act should be treated similarly. 12
Oversimplifying to a modest degree, the Court indicates that
the issue of coverage turns on the communicative nature of Johnson's act. 13 It refers to an earlier flag case 14 that asks whether "[a]n
intent to convey a particularized message was present, and
[whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it." 15 As Nimmer explained, it is not
enough that conduct convey some meaning to observers; 16 under
11. M. NtMMER, supra note 1, § 3.06[8][1], at 3-42.
12. For convenience of administration, one might draw a sharp constitutional line
between speech and writing and other acts. But that would not be a satisfactory approach. Not only do some things other than speech and writing qualify for first amendment protection, but some speech and writing is outside its ambit. Words of agreement
to commit crimes, threats such as those uttered in a robbery, and perhaps some other
uses of language have nothing to do with free speech. See K. GREENAWALT, SPEECH,
CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE (1989).
13. Someone might successfully claim that a statute applying to him or her was
invalid on its face under the first amendment although his or her own conduct was
noncommunicative. And it remains to be seen whether even obviously communicative
acts will trigger serious first amendment scrutiny when they violate common criminal
provisions, such as restrictions on speeding, parking, and drug use. According to standard first amendment law, a claimant's success on the initial issue of coverage assures
application of at least the test from United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), which
nominally requires that the state's interest be substantial if suppression is to be upheld.
See infra note 20 and accompanying text. For any serious crime, the state's interest is
substantial and thus it does not matter whether the "level of scrutiny" is the very weak
ordinary due process test of rational basis or the O'Brien test. But imagine that someone with an explanatory sign violates a speed limit arguably set very low to "catch outof-towners," or violates a tenuously defensible parking limit or an unusual prohibition
on use of a drug allowed elsewhere. I am skeptical that in such cases a court will or
should examine seriously the strength of a state's interest in having such a law or in
prosecuting those with a communicative message. The Court's very recent evisceration
of free excercise rights against general prohibitions, Employment Division, Department
of Human Resources v. Smith, 58 U.S.L.W. 4433 (1990), makes one wonder if free
speech rights will fare any better.
14. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2538-40 (1989) (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974)).
15. Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11.
16. M. NIMMER, supra note l, § 3.06[C], at 3-44.

1990)

FLAG BURNING AS SPEECH

929

such a standard every act seen by others would qualify for first
amendment protection. It also is not enough that an actor have a
subjective aim to communicate.
The unworkability of using a subjective criterion alone is evident when one reflects on prosecutions for public nudity. A college
student who streaks across campus on a dare may have no message
he is trying to communicate consciously. A person who sits nude in
cold weather in front of City Hall in protest of treatment of the
homeless has an obvious message. What of bathers who are nude
on a relatively secluded part of a public beach in the summer?
Some simply enjoy bathing and sunning nude. A few may find the
sensation unpleasant, but wish to upset prudish restrictions. Most
have more complex motivations. They enjoy bathing nude. They
also disapprove of the restrictions they are violating and take appearing nude as a kind of implicit statement against the restrictions.
Let us suppose that on a particular day all the bathers expect to be
seen by each other and by a few members of the larger public.
None have signs around their necks or next to their towels explaining why they are nude. An observer cannot know why any one
person is nude. We can quickly understand why any serious constitutional test for conviction should not turn on a particular bather's
subjective motivation, discoverable only after the fact and difficult
then to determine with confidence.
This illustration suggests a possible further limit to conduct
protected by the first amendment-that communication be the conduct's dominant aim. It may be that those who break laws of which
they do not approve wish in part to communicate their disapproval,
and are so understood by others; but it is doubtful that such ordinary lawbreaking should qualify for serious first amendment
scrutiny.
In any event, such subtleties are not a problem in Johnson. If
acts other than utterances of language count as speech, Johnson's
clearly do. He was in a political demonstration, and the burning of
the flag was an intense symbol of rejection of American policy and
nationalism. In context, the general drift of Johnson's message was
comprehensible to observers. Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent flirts
with rejection of this conclusion. He says that "flag burning is the
equivalent of an inarticulate grunt or roar that, it seems fair to say,
is most likely to be indulged in not to express any particular idea,
but to antagonize others." 17 If ordinary action, or even verbal ut17. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2553 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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terance, were engaged in solely to antagonize, perhaps the actor
should enjoy no protection under the first amendment; 18 but plainly
more was involved here. The burning of a revered symbol antagonized, but it also communicated a strong message. The first threshold of constitutional protection was crossed easily by Johnson.
B.

The Constitutional Level of Scrutiny

The second stage of analysis is determining the constitutional
level of scrutiny. This was the important stage in Johnson, and it is
at this stage where the new federal statute might yield a different
outcome. The critical question for the second stage is whether application of a law will be governed by the formulation in United
States v. O'Brien 19 or by some more demanding standard.
O'Brien was convicted for publicly burning his draft card.
Congress had recently enacted a provision forbidding destruction of
draft cards. Before that, the law had punished failures to observe
selective service regulations, which had required registrants to keep
their draft cards. Burning one's draft card was punishable by up to
five years in prison. The new statute prescribed the same penalty.
Few doubted that the dominant aim of Congress was to restrict
public burning of draft cards by protesters against the Vietnam
War. Refusing to look beyond language to underlying purpose,
however, the Court treated the statute as not directed at communication. Assuming, after initial equivocation, that the communicative element of O'Brien's conduct brought the first amendment into
play, the Court then elaborated a test for such circumstances. A
government regulation otherwise within constitutional power is sufficiently justified "if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest. " 20 Requiring that the government
have a substantial interest, not any plausible interest, and demanding that the restriction of expression be no greater than is essential
to further the interest, the Court seemed to set a fairly stringent
18. Some thoughts about purely antagonistic speech are developed in K. GREENAsupra note 12, at 90-129, 141-57, and in Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are
They Protected Speech?, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 287 (1990).
19. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
20. Id. More recently, the Court has suggested that what the O'Brien test permits
may not be much different from time, place, and manner restrictions. See Clark v.
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984).
WALT,
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balancing test that goes well beyond the "rational basis" review that
applies to any statute. O'Brien sounds as if those engaging in communicative acts are getting significant protection even if a statute is
not directed at communication.
In practice, the O'Brien test has worked out differently. In
O'Brien itself the Court accepted thin claims that granting a right to
burn draft cards would interfere with the effective administration of
the draft. In no later case has the Court actually held that a defendant's communicative activity was protected against application of a
law not directed at communication. Since Johnson's prospects
would have been poor had the Court used only the O'Brien test, the
inquiry whether the Texas provision was directed at communication
was of major importance. Thus, also, it is critically imp_ortant
whether the Court will determine that the new federal statute is
directed at communication.
Some of what the Supreme Court says in Johnson on this subject, and some of what two district courts say in reviewing the new
federal statute, is a bit confusing. An initial effort at categorization
may be clarifying. One way in which a law may be directed at communication is in distinguishing between good messages and bad
ones. This is what is known as viewpoint discrimination. Since the
government should not be in the business of preferring some
messages to others, viewpoint discrimination rightly has been seen
as highly threatening to free speech values and is considered to be
invalid absent an extremely strong justification. 21 Another way in
which a law might be said to be directed at communication is by
penalizing communicative acts that have harmful consequences,
with harm judged independently of acceptance or rejection of the
message. A law forbiding communications that are highly likely to
cause deep emotional upset or to trigger violent responses is of this
sort. We may call this harmful reaction regulation. A third way in
which a law conceivably might be said to be directed at communication is when it protects the communicative value of something. We
may call this symbol protection. It is incorrect to suppose that such
a law inevitably must be aimed at acts which are themselves communicative. Suppose a country's flag is one solid color, bright red.
To protect the symbolic force of that color, the state forbids any
human use of bright red except in the flag. No walls or cars can be
painted bright red, no clothes can be dyed bright red. The law aims
21. However, there are forms of regulation, such as laws against criminal solicitation, that may involve viewpoint discrimination but that may not call. for exacting scrutiny. See K. GREENAWALT, supra note 12, at 225-26.
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to protect the communicative force of a symbol, but it is not aimed
particularly at communicative acts.
Viewpoint discrimination, harmful reaction regulation, and
symbol protection are the three critical categories for Johnson and
for appraisal of the new federal law. Laws may be directed at communication in at least two other ways as well. Statutes may treat
certain subject matters differently from others; they may restrict advertising or communications about sex to an extent greater than
communications about politics or religion. Finally, laws may restrict particular methods of communication, such as billboards or
demonstrations, more than other methods. Subject matter regulation is not at issue for flag burning. Method restriction is involved,
but I suggest later why it is not crucial.
In considering viewpoint discrimination, harmful reaction regulation, and symbol protection, we need to recognize possible relationships between what the law on its surface does, and what else is
really going on. The connections can be of two kinds, high correlations and underlying motivations. Thus, harmful reactions may
correlate dominantly with particular viewpoints, and regulation of
harmful reactions may be motivated by an aim to attack unpalatable views. With these categories and relationships in mind, we ate
ready to face the opinions.
The Texas statute under which Johnson was convicted prohibited flag desecration, defined as damage or mistreatment of the flag
"in a way that the• actor knows will seriously offend" someone
"likely to observe or discover his action. " 22 Since burning has been
a recommended way to dispose of worn out flags, not every burning
of the flag was offensive. In form, the statute was regulation to prevent harmful reaction, the offense to observers. What makes flag
burning offensive? Almost always it is that the people burning the
flag are intentionally showing some kind of disrespect for it. That
need nqt be so. We can imagine someone lighting a campfire with a
flag that happens to be near at hand, and the Court itself mentions a
tired person dragging a flag through the mud. 23 Either act might
cause offense, and the actor might know that, yet he would have no
message to communicate. But these are rare instances.
The Court recognizes in a footnote that the statute could apply
to someone lacking a communicative purpose. 24 Why does it not
22. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09(b) (Vernon 1974).
23. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2538-39 n.3 (1989).
24. Id. Footnote three of the opinion explains why the Court need not resolve
Johnson's facial challenge to the Texas statute. The footnote is puzzling because most of

\
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conclude that the statute was aimed at something other than communication? The answer lies in its understanding of what caused
offense in Johnson and would cause offense in almost all instances.
The Court differs with Chief Justice Rehnquist about the ground of
offense. Although the Court says it is the message that caused offense, Rehnquist says it is not the message but the use of the symbol
of the flag. Each is half right. Rehnquist is correct that people
would not be offended, or would be much less offended, were the
message of hostility to government communicated in some other
way. But suppose demonstrators visibly were supporting the government by performing a skit in which the "good guys" stop a
"bad" flag burner. This burning probably would not cause nearly
as much offense to the people upset at Johnson. The intense negative reaction flowed from a combination of the message and its being communicated by flag burning.
Assuming that the basis for people's taking offense is the
message communicated, the Court does not immediately conclude
that strict scrutiny of the statute is required. It asks instead
whether the state has an interest behind its prohibition on flag burning that is unrelated to the suppression of expression. 25 If the state
had such an interest, it would apparently succeed in achieving the
more relaxed scrutiny of O'Brien. One asserted state interest was
the prevention of violence. The Court points out that offense is
often not followed by violence and that first amendment decisions
closely circumscribe when speech may be punished because of a
likely violent reaction. Much controversial speech causes offense,
and states cannot forbid all offensive speech because violence may
occasionally result. This is standard first amendment doctrine, and
the Gourt rightly eliminates prevention of violence as a basis for the
Texas statute.
The Court seems to assume, however, that if the statute had
applied only when ·violence was highly likely, it would not have
been· directed at expression. That assumption involves a serious
confusion, one that obscures what is at issue when offense is caused.
Someone who reacts violently at a communication initially feels offense and anger. The content of the message triggers violence, just
as it triggers offense. If the state's genuine wish is to prevent violence or offense, it can say it does not really care about the content
the Court's analysis suggests that in the vast majority of instances covered by the statute, conviction would be unconstitutional; if that is so, it is hard to see how the provision could survive a challenge for overbreadth.
25. Id. at 2541.
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of the communication; it wants only to prevent an independent
harm, physical harm or emotional upset. Without quite resolving
the point, the Johnson Court expresses doubt that "a desire to prevent a violent audience reaction is 'related to expression' in the
same way that a desire to prevent an audience from being offended
is 'related to expression.' " 26 But plainly the relations are similar.
The differences are that preventing violence is usually a more important state interest and that is is less likely to be a cover for suppressing unpopular messages.
We need to recognize that the relations to expression are similar, because we should be open to the possibility that deep offense
alone may sometimes be the basis for restriction on speech. Consider the accompanying subsection of the Texas statute that forbade
desecration of a place of worship or burial. 27 Usually when places
of worship and burial are desecrated, it is by people who do not own
the places. But this provision is not formulated as a protection of
property; it is formulated to protect symbols and sites. And we can
imagine a case in which the actual owner of a place of worship or
burial chooses for some reason to desecrate it. Such acts can cause
deep offense to worshipers or family members. There are direct victims in a way that is not true when one burns a flag. One reason
libel is actionable is because it offends. And what about fighting
words? The drift of modern Supreme Court opinions is that only
the prospect of immediate violence is a basis for forbidding the use
of harsh personal insults and general epithets. If a white man
shouts a vicious racial epithet at a black man, he can be punished.
But suppose five white males shout racial and sexual epithets at a
black woman alone in the park. Are these not punishable because a
violent response is highly unlikely? I believe offense should sometimes warrant restrictions on speech, but probably only when there
are immediate identifiable victims.
Having disposed of violence prevention as a possible basis for
the statute, the Johnson Court turns to another asserted state justification, that of preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and
national unity. The Court says that the state's interest is related to
expression. It suggests that the state's concern is that flag desecration will cause people to stop believing that the flag stands for nationhood and national unity or that we enjoy unity as a nation.
"These concerns blossom only when a person's treatment of the flag
26. Id. at 2541 n.4.
27. TEX. PENAL CODE

ANN.

§ 42.09(a)(2) (Vernon 1974).
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communicates some message .... " 28 Since Johnson's "political expression was restricted" because he expressed dissatisfaction with
the country's policies, the "State's asserted interest in preserving the
· special symbolic character of the flag" must be subjected to the
"'most exacting scrutiny.' " 29
The Court's analysis on this point flows too smoothly. It treats
application of the Texas law like application of a law that forbids
displaying within fifty feet of an embassy signs that tend to bring
that foreign government into "public odium" or "public disrepute."
That law, struck down in Boos v. Barry, 30 was a straightforward
regulation of content; it was viewpoint discrimination. Displaying
near the Soviet embassy a sign praising the Soviet Union or neutral
toward it is not criminal; displaying a highly critical sign is criminal. But was viewpoint discrimination really involved in the Texas
statute? Suppose people constantly dragged flags through the mud
and used them to light campfires. The strength of the flag as a symbol might well diminish if people continually treated it shabbily.
And its strength as a symbol could be damaged even if people mistreated it in demonstrations in favor of nationhood and national
unity. Thus, the threat to the flag as a symbol of nationhood and
national unity does not flow only from mistreatment that casts
doubt on whether the flag represents national unity, whether national unity exists, or whether national unity of the sort we have is
desirable. It is just this point that leads Justice Stevens to say in
dissent that "[t]he content of respondent's message has no relevance
whatsoever to the case." 31 Nevertheless, the most offensive instances of shabby treatment are probably those that in some way
attack the government, national unity, or the idea of the flag; and
this type of attack was an aspect of Johnson's causing offense. Further, most people who wish to treat the flag shabbily knowing that
what they do will offend others will be people with just such antiestablishment messages. In effect, the Texas law impinges much
more heavily on people with these messages than on others. The
Johnson Court oversimplifies by assuming that an effort to preserve
the flag as a symbol of national unity must be directed at communications against that idea; but its conclusion that the interest of
Texas is aimed against such communications is sound.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2542.
Id. at 2543.
485 U.S. 312 (1988).
Johnso_n, 109 S. Ct. at 2557 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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C. Application of the Standard to Johnson
In the third stage of first amendment analysis, the Court has
little difficulty determining that Texas has failed to meet "the most
exacting scrutiny." 32 The government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because it is disagreeable. Nor may the government preclude messages from being expressed in particular ways
chosen by those who want to express the ideas. People are normally
free to choose how they will express themselves. The government
may not restrict symbols to be used for a limited set of messages.
The Court closes with the thought that its
decision is a reaffirmation of the principles of freedom and inclusiveness that the flag best reflects, and of the conviction that our
.toleration of criticism such as Johnson's is a sign and source of
our strength . . . . It is the Nation's resilience, not its rigidity,
that Texas sees reflected in the flag-and it is that resilience that
we reassert today. 33

D.

The New Federal Statute

In the aftermath of Johnson, most political discussion focused
not on whether the decision should be undone but on how it could
be undone. Our political leaders have learned the lesson that being
cast as unpatriotic is not healthy for their political lives, and their
confidence in the public's understanding of true patriotism is certainly not excessive. Republican leaders wanted a constitutional
amendment and claimed that only that could succeed in undoing
what the Supreme Court had done; many Democrats, encouraged
by Dick Howard, Rex Lee, Laurence Tribe, and other constitutional scholars, argued that statutory reform could turn the result
around. 34 Since the Johnson decision was five to four, turning the
result around amounts to shifting one vote. The Johnson opinion
holds out tidbits of hope in this respect.
The Flag Protection Act of 1989 provides that anyone who
"knowingly mutilates, defaces, physically defiles, burns, maintains
on the floor or ground, or tramples upon" a United States flag is
guilty of a crime. 35 The Act excepts actions to dispose of worn or
soiled flags. Congre~s defeated efforts to amend the bill to cover
32. See id. at 2543-44.
33. Id. at 2547.
34. See 135 CONG. REC. S8087-90 (daily ed. July 18, 1989) (speech by Sen. Biden);
Tribe, Protect It-And Ideas, N.Y. Times, July 3, 1989, § 1, at 19, col. 1.
35. Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 107-131, 103 Stat. 777 (Oct. 28, 1989)
(amending 18 U.S.C. § 700 (1988)).
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only public acts; the law covers acts committed in private as well as
in public. The idea underlying the statute is plain enough. The definition of the crime is removed as far as possible from focusing on
communicative acts. The objective is to have this statute treated
like the draft card statute in O'Brien. If it is treated as a statute not
directed at communication that happens to interfere with some acts
of symbolic speech, the O'Brien test will apply when communicative
flag burning is punished. That standard of scrutiny is much more
lenient than strict scrutiny. It is the drafters' aspiration that convictions will be upheld.
Let me first look at the problem from the perspective of a realist jurisprudence that does not place much stock in coherent doctrine. The Johnson Court says that "[t]he Texas law is thus not
aimed at protecting the physical integrity of the flag in all circumstances, but is designed instead to protect it only against impairments that would cause serious offense to others." 36 The Court
then refers in a footnote to Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion in
Smith v. Goguen, 37 a 1974 case involving conviction of a young man
who affixed a flag to the seat of his pants. 38 Justice Blackmun
thought that the conviction was permissible because the opinion of
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court indicated that it was not
for any communicative element but for interfering with the physical
integrity of the flag. 39 The new federal law, focusing on physical
integrity, is evidently tailored to pick up the vote of the 1974 Justice
Blackmun. 40 One imagines that the reservation and footnote in
Johnson may very well be in at Justice Blackmun's request, and undoubtedly with his acquiesence; so probably he has not decided yet
that his position in Goguen is untenable as to flag burning. Further,
the vote of Justice Kennedy with the majority came as something of
a surprise, and he expresses regret that constitutional principles
compel the result they do. Finally, a Justice appalled at the idea of
a constitutional amendment might be inclined to forestall that prospect by finding application of the new statute acceptable. Thus,
36. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2543.
37. 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
38. See Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2543 n.6 (citing Justice Blackmun's dissent in Smith,
415 U.S. at 590-91).
39. Smith, 415 U.S. at 590 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Goguen, 361 Mass. 846, 846, 279 N.E.2d 666, 667 (1972)).
40. In United States v. Haggerty, 731 F. Supp. 415 (W.D. Wash.), prob. juris.
noted, 58 U.S.L.W. 3627 (1990), Judge Rothstein states that the new act is not the sort
of legislation considered by Justice Blackmun because the types of conduct forbidden
are those usually associated with disrespect and because other conduct that could
threaten the physical integrity of the flag is not forbidden.
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proponents of the statutory route had substantial reason to hope
their efforts would be crowned with success.
What of doctrinal coherence? The Court might distinguish
Johnson because the federal government has a legitimate interest in
the flag's physical integrity per se or because the government's aim
to preserve the flag as a national symbol is different somehow from
the similar purpose that Texas asserted.
The government's interest in preserving the physical integrity
of the flag might be put as some kind of property interest or as a
sovereignty interest. In his Johnson dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist draws on a case giving exclusive use of the word "Olympic" to
the United States Olympic Committee. 41 He suggests that the government may have a similar limited property right in the flag. Later
he mentions an opinion by Justice Fortas urging that private ownership of a flag is subject to special burdens and responsibilities. 42
However, those who burn flags are not trying to take a "free ride"
on the work of others as are those who use the word "Olympic" for
their own endeavors. And the only conceivable property interest
the government has in privately owned flags is to protect the flag as
a symbol. The House of Representatives pressed the sovereignty
interest before district courts considering dismissal of prosecutions
of people who burned flags in protest against passage of the new
Act. 43 The courts recognized that any sovereignty claim in flags
comes down to a claim to protect the flag as a symbol. The property and sovereignty arguments dissolve into an argument that the
government should be able to preserve the flag's symbolic power.
The Senate argued to the district courts that the federal law's
aim to preserve the flag as a symbol differs from that urged by
Texas. The idea is to preserve the flag as an embodiment of diverse
views and not as a representative of any one view. What principles
must be accepted if this argument is to be the vehicle by which strict
scrutiny is to be avoided? The Court must decide: (1) that the interest of protecting the flag as a symbol does not establish that the law
is aimed at communicative acts; (2) that protecting the flag as a
symbol does not impermissibly discriminate between forms of ex41. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2552 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing San Francisco
Arts & Athletics v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987)).
42. Id. at 2554 (citing Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969) (Fortas, J.,
dissenting)).
43. See Haggerty, 731 F. Supp. 415; United States v. Eichman, Criminal Nos. 890419, 89-0420, 89-0421 (D.D.C.) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file), prob. juris. noted,
58 U.S.L.W. 3627 (1990).
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pression; and (3) that the aim to protect the flag as a symbol by
penal legislation is not itself an impermissible or highly suspect aim
to favor certain ideas.
In Johnson, the Court assumes that only acts with a message
could threaten the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national
unity. Suppose it were right. The federal law prohibits some acts
that are noncommunicative, but if its underlying purpose to protect
the flag as a symbol concerns only communicative acts, the law is
directed at speech. As I have noted, the Johnson Court is wrong on
this point. Noncommunicative acts can tarnish the flag as a symbol.44 So the purpose of preserving the flag as a symbol does reach
some defacing and destruction of the flag that is noncommunicative.
But the correlation between forbidden acts that pose the threat and
those meant to communicate is very high; moreover, the legislative
history contains overwhelming evidence that Congress was concerned about those who intentionally show disrespect for the flag.
Despite the absence of any surface reference to communicative acts,
the purpose of the law is to inhibit expression. Although I shall not
make the argument, I believe that purpose is so clearly establishable
here that it should not be disregarded by the courts. 45
Whether a simple aim to preserve the flag as a symbol discriminates in favor of certain views or forms of expression is a harder
question. District Judge Rothstein notes that the new law suppresses the views of those who want to express themselves by destroying the flag. 46 But that could be said of any restriction on a
form of expression. The law against destruction of draft cards suppresses those who want to express themselves that way; a law
against billboards suppresses those who want to speak through billboards. That form of discrimination alone does not trigger strict
scrutiny. Because most of those who want to destroy flags have
antiestablishment messages, the law might be understood as discriminating against such messages, but perhaps this high correlation alone should not be enough to trigger strict scrutiny.
The most complex question is whether an aim to protect the
flag as a symbol is an impermissible or highly suspect objective for
penal legislation in and of itself. This question is a critical one for
provisions directed against flag misuse as well as flag destruction,
44. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
45. Cf Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (impermissible purpose clear for right
to silence legislation). I say a bit more about this in K. GREENAWALT, supra note 12,
at 332 (drawing from Laurence Tribe's analysis).
46. Haggerty, 731 F. Supp. at 428.
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for provisions meant to guard against trivialization as well as symbolic rejection. Let us suppose that most of the acts a legislature is
worried about are not hostile expressive acts at all; it fears that various uses or misuses of the flag will dilute its force. Recall the example of a law forbidding people to use the bright red color for any
purpose, the aim being to preserve the symbolic force of that color
in the flag. One may argue that the government can have a flag,
that it can promote reverence for the flag, and that its aim to do that
by laws limiting use are a permissible means. On the other hand,
one may argue that special protection for a communicative symbol
with particular content, however vague, is itself a kind of viewpoint
discrimination. As Professor Nimmer put it, the flag symbolizes the
nation and to "preserve respect for a symbol qua symbol is to preserve respect for the meaning expressed by the symbol."47 The argument to this effect is strong enough to distinguish this case from
one in which the government's interest in preventing behavior has
nothing to do with communication. The Court said in O'Brien, disregarding legislative history that showed an aim to stop protesters
from burning draft cards, that the government's interest in preserving draft cards was unrelated to expression. That could not be said
about the government's interest in preserving flags. At a minimum,
the aim is to preserve the powerful expressive force of the flag.
Thus, the O'Brien test does not seem apt. But "most exacting scrutiny" may not be right either. The aim to keep intact expressive
symbols people have come to care about, and that the government
regards as a positive force, is not the same as an aim to suppress
messages because of their content. If the only challengeable aspect
of the new federal law were its attempt to preserve the flag as a
symbol, perhaps some test more rigorous than what O'Brien has
come to mean, but less rigorous than most exacting scrutiny, would
be appropriate.
I have concluded that Johnson was a more complicated case
than the majority indicated but that an application of standard first
amendment principles supports the Court's result. The challenge to
the new federal statute is closer to the border. A purpose to preserve the flag as a symbol is not necessarily aimed at communicative
acts. Preserving the physical integrity of the flag has some value
independent of the reason why a flag might be destroyed. But the
47. M. NIMMER, supra note 1, § 3.06[E], at 3-63. John Ely reaches a similar conclusion in a well-known article. See Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of
Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482,
1504-06 (1975).
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value has to do with communication, positive "flag communication." Further, the new federal law, by the particular actions it covers and as indicated by its legislative history, is dominantly aimed at
hostile communication. Measured against coherent doctrine rather
than likely outcome, the result of cases considering the new law
should be the same as in Johnson.

Ill.

THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EXCEPTION

I now turn away from standard doctrines to ask whether there
is something so special about the flag that it calls for an extraordinary approach. One could employ an argument for exceptional
treatment to attack the result in Johnson, to support a different outcome under the new law, or to support a constitutional amendment
permitting flag legislation. 48
Much in the Johnson opinions shows that the powerful symbolic quality of the flag makes the case special. Justice Kennedy,
the most recent appointee, writes a concurring opinion, explaining
that "the law and the Constitution," as he sees it, "compel the result."49 He agrees with the dissenters "that the flag holds a lonely
place of honor in an age when absolutes are distrusted and simple
truths are burdened by unneeded apologetics." 50 He talks of Johnson's statements as "repellent ... to the Republic itself" and of the
enormity of Johnson's otfense. 51 But he does not believe the Constitution gives the right to rule as the dissenters urge, "however painful this judgment· is to announce." 52 Justice Kennedy's opinion
reminds one of the cry of the recently appointed Justice Blackmun
in Furman v. Georgia 53 that however much he disapproved of capi48. I discuss the issue in terms of making an exception to ordinary first amendment
principles. What that would amount to more specifically is subjecting flag legislation to
less than "most exacting scrutiny," even though by ordinary standards, it falls within a
category for which such scrutiny is appropriate. The special nature of the flag might be
the basis for an argument that the government's protective interest is so compelling that
properly drafted legislation satisfies "most exacting scrutiny." On this account, ordinary first amendment approaches would be employed; what would be extraordinary
would be satisfaction of the test of strict scrutiny absent violence or some other immediate or indisputable harm.
49. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2548 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
50. Id.
51. Id:
52. Id.
53. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). To me the Furman issue,
whether the state can execute criminals, dwarfs the importance of whether disrespect
· for the flag is protected; but his may reflect a special insensitivity to which I shall
return.
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tal punishment, the Constitution did not authorize him to declare
that it was generally unconstitutional.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion, for himself and Justices
White and O'Connor, is largely an amalgam of history and poetry
about the flag and a series of citations to past cases indicating that
none have decided th;it flag desecration statutes are unconstitutional. Interesting in the first part of the opinion is a reference to a
statement by Representative Charles Wiggins during the Vietnam
War: "The public act of desecration of our flag tends to undermine
the morale of American troops. That this finding is true can be
attested by many Members [of Congress] who have received correspondence from servicemen expressing their shock and disgust of
such conduct." 54 It is a little hard to pin down the theory of the
Rehnquist opinion. The Chief Justice suggests that Congress can
recognize a kind of property interest in the flag, that flag burning,
like fighting words, is not an "essential part of any exposition of
ideas," that state cases have held that public burning of the flag is
inherently inflammatory, and that Johnson could have expressed his
ideas by other means. 55 Chief Justice Rehnquist simply disregards
Supreme Court cases whose holdings undermine most of these arguments as applied to Johnson. 56 In his final paragraph, the Chief
Justice writes that "[u]ncritical extension of constitutional protection to the burning of the flag risks the frustration of the very purpose for which organized governments are instituted." 57
Although Justice Stevens challenges some of the majority's reasoning, perhaps the heart of his position is that "[e]ven if flag burning could be considered just another species of symbolic speech
under the logical application of the rules that the Court has developed in its interpretation of the First Amendment in other contexts,
this case has an intangible dimension that makes those rules inapplicable. " 58 Stevens notes that the flag represents mo.re than our nationhood; it represents the ideas that characterize the society. 59 He
worries that sanctioning public desecration will tarnish the value of
the flag, and urges that such tarnish is not justified by the trivial
burden on expression of forbidding physical mistreatment of the
54. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2551 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting 113 CONG.
REC. 16459 (daily ed. June 20, 1967) (statement of Rep. Wiggins)).
55. Id. at 2551-54.
56. Id. at 2554-55.
57. Id. at 2555.
58. Id. at 2556 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
59. Id.
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flag. 60 He closes with the claim that if the ideas of liberty and equality are worth fighting for, "the flag that uniquely symbolizes their
power" is worthy of protection. 61 The Court itself talks of "the
flag's deservedly cherished place in our community" and suggests
that its decision will strengthen that place by reasserting the flag's
resilience. 62 All the opinions share a feature that speaks volumes
about the flag's importance and the expected audience for the opinions. No opinion cites a single law review article or other scholarly
work. It is almost as if all the Justices intuitively felt that cluttering
their opinions with nice doctrinal distinctions and ample references
to authority would detract from the majestic simplicity of the flag
and the majestic simplicity of freedom of speech.
Perhaps the major legal issue in Johnson is whether the flag is
sufficiently special to warrant an exception from ordinary free
speech principles. In Marsh v. Chambers, 63 dealing with paid chaplains and prayers in state legislatures, the Court explicitly abandoned the normal establishment clause test, under which those
practices would surely have been condemned, and declared that an
exception based on history was appropriate. Here the Court might
have emphasized, as did Chief Justice Rehnquist, the unique historical place of the flag and found that unusual protections were called
for.
Would such an exception be warranted? Some people might
answer that such exceptions are never warranted. If a court has
sound doctrinal principles for resolving a broad class of cases, if
these principles resolve a case one way, and if the case does not lead
one to think that the principles themselves stand in need of revision,
perhaps a court should simply stick with what the principles indicate should be done. My confidence in the ability of abstract principles to deal with our confused and complex social reality is a bit less
than that of many who insist on unwavering adherence to principle.
Making exceptions is risky. How can one be sure an exception is
justified? Is it not likely that making warranted exceptions will lead
to unwarranted ones? The burden against ad hoc exceptions to
principles that cover a general class of situations is great, but it can
be overcome. Are the reasons for an exception here compelling
enough?
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Id. at 2557.
Id. at 2547.
463 U.S. 783 (1983).
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Let us think about the right to mistreat flags and the possible
damage if we recognize such a right. In terms of the actual ability
to express oneself, the right to destroy one's national flag does not
rate very high. There are other ways to express antigovernment and
antinational sentiments. Not many people want to mistreat their
national flag. A narrow constitutional exception covering desecration of the national flag would not much affect the degree of free
speech in our society. But the right to physically mistreat the flag in
a contemptuous way has a broader significance. The right itself reflects the degree of our commitment to free speech. The existence
of the right may have an importance for liberty that greatly exceeds
the importance of its exercise. In this sense, the Court's claim that
its decision in Johnson will strengthen the flag by showing its resilience to dramatic protest has force.
·
What protecting against destruction does to the symbolic value
of the flag is more complicated. All the opinions talk as if any
weakening of that value would be regrettable. The dissenters say
Johnson will have that effect; the five justices in the majority deny it.
Drawing on the distinction between the Frenchfleur-de-lis and the
French tricolor, Justice Stevens perceptively observes that our flag
represents particular ideas other than nationhood. 64 If our flag represents liberty as a central value, then ~Bowing its mistreatment
conceivably will strengthen its representation of liberty. That is
what the majority argues. But it seems to me that Justice Stevens
has the truer insight about the nature of symbols. They may represent ideas and complex values and forms of life to which we give
knowing adherence, but the power of the symbol itself operates at a
nonrational level. Through continued usage and honor, we develop
feelings of reverence for the symbol itself. If others do not respect
the symbol our own respect for it is likely to decline, and this may
happen even if we do not consciously will it. Disrespect by 9bvious
enemies of one's deeper values will not undermine the value of a
symbol. If ancient Romans or modern Communists break crosses,
that does not undermine the power of the cross as a symbol for
Christians. But if people with whom one identifies, more or less,
show disrespect for a shared symbol, it loses luster. For this reason,
commercialization and trivialization of the flag, for instance in
clothing, may actually have a more insidious effect on its power
than overtly hostile actions by dissidents.
64. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2556 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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The opinions are unanimous in wishing to preserve the flag
from weakening as a symbol. Are they right in that aim? I was
struck by Justice Kennedy's comment that "the flag holds a lonely
place of honor in an age when absolutes are distrusted and simple
truths are burdened by unneeded apologetics. " 65 If the flag is the
best one has to believe in, is something wrong? And if one believes
in the flag more than anything else, is one confused? The meanings
that people assign to the flag may vary, but if someone has lost faith
in whatever meanings he assigns, why should he continue to believe
so strongly in the flag? Rationally, strong belief in the flag should
coincide with strong belief in something else, not be a substitute for
it.
There are moreover negative aspects of "honoring the flag." If
we attach a kind of nonrational reverence to the flag, we are subject
to manipulation by those who control the flag. Now, of course, no
one really controls the flag; it can be used on behalf of dissident
causes as well as progovernment ones. But Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion is remarkably accurate in mentioning wars, burials
of soldiers, patriotic occasions, and government buildings as connected to our associations with the flag. Our introduction to the
flag as a symbol is largely in these contexts. By its very composition, the flag symbolizes the federal union of the original thirteen
states and of the present fifty states. The symbolism of the flag operates in favor of the government as well as in favor of the national
union. The next to last sentence of the Rehnquist opinion talks of
men being conscripted into "the Armed Forces where they must
fight and perhaps die for the flag." 66 How easily this phrase evokes
our feelings, but people should fight and perhaps die for what the
flag represents, not for the flag. Of course, Chief Justice Rehnquist
might respond that I am just being picky; that is what he meant.
But the argument for protecting the flag is much stronger if one
thinks of fighting for the flag itself. This notion involves the strongest form of reification, attributing value to a thing that has no inherent value. Recall Charles Wiggins's lament that flag desecration
undermined the morale of American troops in Vietnam. Chief Justice Rehnquist does not delve into the question why. Suppose it
were reported that some unrepresentative fringe, say a few citizens
of Albanian origin, had burned American flags because our government did not protest the Yugoslav government's treatment of its
65. Id. at 2548 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 2555 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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Albanian minority. Would knowledge of that act have demoralized
troops in Vietnam? Presumably what demoralized the troops was
knowing a fairly wide opposition to the war was so intensely felt by
some citizens that they engaged in the extreme act of burning the
flag. But the intensity of their opposition was precisely what the
protesters were trying to express. If demoralizing is taken to mean
sapping the will to fight, they wanted to demoralize the citizenry
generally about the war in Vietnam. In a free society in which
soldiers know what is happening back home, a natural effect of undermining the will of the public to fight may be demoralizing
soldiers to a degree.
If the flag is venerated, reverence for the flag may become a
substitute for critical thought about government policy. Part of the
point of a free society is that images of flag-draped coffins should
not lull us into easy belief that the government's use of military
force was justified. Given the ordinary and major occasions of its
use, there is such a thing as too much reverence for the flag as a
symbol.
Finally, insofar as the flag can be said to represent particular
values, perhaps some of those values are now too highly regarded.
Chief Justice Rehnquist reports that Johnson shouted various slogans: "Reagan, Mondale which will it be? Either one means World
War III"; "Ronald Reagan, killer of the hour, perfect example of
U.S. power"; and "red; white and blue, we spit on you, you stand
for plunder, you will go under." 67 Certainly one of the ideas that
our flag represents is our relatively free and capitalist economic system. It also represents the importance of national interests and, in
our times, it is a sign of national power. Johnson was urging
crudely that the pursuit of American power and national interests is
unjust and promises nuclear destruction. Johnson did not really
question that the flag stands for nationhood and that nationhood
exists; rather, he challenged the desirability of our concept of nationhood. Perhaps at this stage of history, humankind needs less
emphasis on nationhood. Reverence for the flag, the symbol of our
nationhood, may impair our sensitivity to this possibility.
My last comments disturb me, partly because of my own feeling for the flag and also from a sense that casting doubt on its place
is disloyal. But I have a more developed basis for my disquiet. Any
society needs symbols of unity and cohesion as well as perceptive
criticisms. One of the diseases of intellectuals is their predominant
67. Id. at 2553.
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attention to the latter; our job is to provide thoughtful criticism. I
may be disqualified by temperament and occupation from giving
due weight to the value of symbols. Perhaps so, but I hope I have
pointed out that reverence for symbols may carry costs. Honor for
the flag is not an undiluted good.
Given uncertainty about the overall effect of a constitutional
decision, either way, on the flag as a symbol, and uncertainty even
about the desirable degree of honor for the flag, my own conclusion
is that the Supreme Court did well in Johnson not to carve out an
exception from ordinary first amendment principles. It should act
similarly in reviewing the new federal law.
V.

A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT

There are two powerful reasons why no constitutional amendment should be adopted if the new federal law is held invalid in its
application to communicative destruction of the flag. The first follows from what I have said about a possible exception to first
amendment principles. On balance, permitting communicative destruction is probably better than forbidding it. The cumbersome
process of formal constitutional amendment is hardly warranted to
deal with what is really a minor problem that may already have
been disposed of in the best way possible. The second reason has to
do with the appropriate function of constitutional amendments.
Unless one counts the thirteenth amendment as overturning language in Dred Scott 68 that slaves are property under the due process
clause of the fifth amendment, not a single constitutional amendment is directed at a Supreme Court decision that guarantees liberty
under the first eight amendments. The Bill of Rights, like the flag,
has a traditional status not to be tampered with lightly. I do not say
that no judicial guarantee of rights could warrant being overturned
by the amendment process, but overturning is a very serious matter.
The rush to overturn Johnson has more to do with political desires
not to be outdone in patriotism than with deep conviction. Using
the amendment process as a quick fix for an unpopular, well-publicized, but minor decision would be a very unfortunate course to
follow. It would have an unhealthy effect on respect for free speech
and respect for the Supreme Court, it would validate a cynical view
of the present state of American politics, and it would provide an
insidious example for the future.

68. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).

